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The model simulates on a 20-year horizon, a first phase of increase in the water resource 
availability taking into account the supply policies by the Senegalese government and a 
second phase with hydrologic deficits due to demand evolution (demographic growth). 
The results show that marginal cost water pricing (with a subsidy ensuring the survival 
of the water production sector) makes it possible in the long term to absorb the shock of 
the resource shortage, GDP, investment and welfare increase. Unemployment drops and 
the sectors of rain rice, market gardening and drinking water distribution grow. In 
contrast, the current policy of average cost pricing of water leads the long-term 
economy in a recession with an agricultural production decrease, a strong degradation 
of welfare and a rise of unemployment.  This result questions the basic tariff (average 
cost) on which block water pricing is based in Senegal.   
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Water is a scarce natural resource in many countries, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa areas 
including Senegal. With strong demand growth, the government initially tried to address the 
scarcity by engaging in many investment plans to increase production capacity. Then, the idea of 
resource use rationalization by demand management developed. Water demand policies has been 
combined with supply policies. This is why we observe a drinking water price increase in most 
developing countries. This increase leads us to ask about its consequences on different sectors in 
particular agricultural sectors that employ a great part of the working population. It also leads us 
to ask about access to drinking water of the poorest households. Therefore, a new tariff policy 
has to be studied by taking account of the direct and indirect repercussions on the whole 
economy, the water-user sectors (agricultural, industrial and services), household incomes and 
total welfare.  
 
To understand all the resource feedback effects and the water pricing policies consequences in 
the long term, we propose a sequential dynamic computable general equilibrium model, which 
take into account long-term resource availability (supply) and demographic growth (demand).  
 
The model simulates a 20-year horizon, a first phase of increase in the water resource availability 
(policies of supply increase by the Senegalese government) and, a second phase with hydrologic 
deficits (demand and demographic growth) in accordance with projections (Management system 
consultants corp, 1998). This scenario presents two cases of water pricing policies: average cost 
(the current policy) versus marginal cost pricing.  The model shows how the economy subjected to 
future risks of water shortages, absorbs the long-term shock if the government maintains average 
cost pricing (current policy in order to ensure budget equilibrium) or if it practices marginal cost 
pricing (with a subsidy to ensure the sector survival). It describes the mechanisms by which the 
evolutions of the different water prices (connection private, standpost and informal) affect on the 
one hand, the resource sector users (agricultural, industrial and services) and on the other hand, 
households (Dakar, other urban and rural areas). It presents the substitution effects between the 
different drinking water modes of supply. Lastly, the model evaluates the water pricing impacts 
(short and the long term) on production (in particular agricultural), unemployment, investment 
and on total welfare.  
  
The first section presents the long-term evolution of drinking water supply and demand in 
Senegal. The second section describes the water pricing policy adopted by the government and 
the third section explains the water pricing scenarios simulated by the CGE model. After a short 
review of the literature in the fourth section, we present the data (Social Accounting Matrix) and 
the model. The last section presents the results of climatic shocks combined with two cases of 
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1. The long-term evolution of the drinking water supply and demand in 
Senegal 
 
In September 2000, Senegal adhered to the Millennium International Declaration objectives. 
Among its objectives, access to basic social services appears and in particular, access to drinking 
water. One of the important objectives is to reduce by half the population not having access to a 
drinking water distribution point by the year 2015. Indeed, the UNDP
2 report notes that 73% of 
the population had access to drinking water (2001).  However, strong geographical disparities 
persist. The 35 liters per person a day objective has not been reached. The Senegal Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (SPRS, 2003-2005) confirms the aim of increasing drinking water service 
quality to the households. Lastly,  the Letter of Sectoral policy (2003) validates the SPRS 
objectives by engaging an important investment plan through the “Water Sectoral Project” 
(WSP). This one aims at increasing drinking water availability and at improving service to users.   
 
1.1 The policy of supply increase  
 
The WSP was elaborated in 1996 to continue the first programme of production capacity 
reinforcement in Dakar and in eleven urban areas, completed in 1993. The objectives of this plan 
consist of improving management and covering costs in order to reduce subsidies, increase 
drinking water access, and engaging the private sector in drinking water urban service 
management. The strategy aims to promote a water resource integrated management to 
coordinate the investment projects, to reinforce the capacity of the realization of the investments 
and to increase the production capacity of 34% (271 000m3/J). Ten backers finance the 
investments (119 billion FCFA) (at August 31, 2003). 75% of these investments are mobilized for 
the production capacity extension and 25% for rehabilitation, reinforcement and extension of the 
distribution networks (1 100km) and connections (60 000, including 14 000 rehabilitated).  
 
Since 2003, a new investment plan, the Long-term water Sectoral Plan (LSP) is in effect. Its aim is 
to ensure drinking water demand satisfaction with financial autonomy for the sector. This plan 
envisages investments of about 116 billion FCFA over one 5-year period for the production 
capacity reinforcement. In the LSP project, the KMS project will lead, in two phases, to a 
treatment capacity of 130 000 m3 a day, a first section allowing the treatment, from 2003, of 65 
000 m3 a day and a second section the additional treatment, from 2007, of 65 000 m3 a day. 
 
1.2 The hydrologic deficits taking into account the long-term demand evolution 
 
Investments have been realized for the reinforcement of production capacity of drinking water. 
However, it is important to take account of resource availability (ground water and surface water) 
and demand evolution (population growth).  
 
A study (Management system consultants corp, 1998) presents this long-term evolution (see the 
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1.2.1 The long-term demand evolution 
 
Water demand study for Dakar - assumptions 
  growth  1996  2000  2010  2020  2030 
Demography          
Population (low assumption)  2,0%  1.917.100  2.132.000  2.696.000  3.220.000  3.674.000 
Population (average assumption)  2,4%  1.917.100  2.161.000  2.832.000  3.570.000  4.335.000 
Population (high assumption)  2,8%  1.917.100  2.190.000  2.969.000  3.869.000  4.880.000 
Source: Management system consultants corp, 1998 
 
Water access rate in 1996 and 2030 (in % of the total population) 
Assumptions  1996  Low  Average  High 
Private connections  65%  70%  80%  85% 
Standposts  26%  20%  15%  10% 
Others  9%  10%  5%  5% 
Source: Management system consultants corp, 1998 
 
Domestic consumption in 1996 and 2030 (in liters per person a day) 
Assumptions  1996  Low  Average  High 
Private connections  50  45,2  71,2  123,1 
Standposts  20  18,1  28,5  35 
Others  11  9,9  15,7  27,1 
All  39  36,2  62  109,5 
Source: Management system consultants corp, 1998 
 
Non domestic water demand (in m3 per day in 1996 and 2030) 
Assumptions  1996  Low  Average  High 
Industrial  16 700  37 000  74 300  125 100 
Commercial  8 000  15 600  30 900  57 900 
Administrations/municipal  24 400  28 600  38 300  55 000 
Total excepted irrigation  49 100  81 200  143 500  238 000 

















Source: Management system consultants corp, 1998 
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We can summarize the water demand evolution in this graphic: 
 
We wonder about the long-term equilibrium question of water demand and resource availability. 
The study (Management system consulting corp, 1998) presents projections in terms of future 
shortages. The assumptions of the study are: 
1)  An availability of the production capacity of 100% 
2)  A water consumption by the market-gardeners of 14 000 m3 a day  
3)  An invoicing rate in Dakar of 79% in 2003, 80,5% in 2004 and 81,5% beyond 
4)  The average assumption of the water demand evolution  
5)  The priority use of the surface water production capacity 
 
 




Since 2006, the ground water withdrawals have been approximately reduced to the third of the 
current withdrawals (173 000 m3 a day in 2002 and 50.000 m3 a day in 2006) with a rise of the 
surface water use. Then, ground water withdrawals will increase gradually to satisfy the water 
demand until reaching the maximum fixed withdrawal. This maximum withdrawal, which will be 
reached in 2015, remain lower by approximately 31% than the annual average withdrawal of the 
year 2002 (173 000 m3 a day in 2002 and 117.000 m3 a day in 2015). Thus, these changes lead to 




  Source : Management system consultants corp, 1998  
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According to the same study, water shortages happen, in particular from 2015. This means that 
new resources will have to be mobilized. The government indicates that these resources could 
come from sites not yet exploited: the lake Guiers, the Maastrichtien aquifer, desalination of 
Seawater, etc.  
 
2. The demand management policy 
 
In spite of the current investment plans aiming at increasing storage capacities, studies find 
disequilibrium between the long-term supply and demand. This is why, following the sector 
privatization (1996), the supply policy needs to be combined with a demand side management 
policy. But this latter remains difficult to implement because it often implies a rise in water prices, 
unpopular for several reasons. Mainly, Senegal pursued in parallel a campaign against poverty. 
This program was accompanied by the introduction of an increasing block tariff structure. The 
majority of the developing countries use an increasing block water tariff, which depends on the 
volume of drinking water consumption. This is justified by the will to pursue a social objective, 
that of the access for all to drinking water.  
 
The Senegalese government objectives through its water pricing policy are: 
-  To target a balanced budget; 
-  To allow the poorest households to consume a water minimum in good hygiene 
conditions; to give them access to private connections, with a social tariff for low 
consumption; 
-  Not to handicap the rest of the economy while supporting the firms for which the 
tariff increases necessary; 
-  To simplify the tariff; 
-  In a scarcity context of the water resource, the aim is to incite the consumer to 
anticipate the level of its consumption. 
 
We present the results of a first assessment of the pricing policy following the privatization of the 
sector (1996). This assessment was established in 2003, when the Water Sectoral Project ends.  
 
2.1 The objective of the average tariff for water 
 
The tariff objective defined by the SONES after the privatization was to reach budget 
equilibrium in 2003 (except the Long-Term Project). Financial projections by the Government 
show that this objective would be achieved with an annual increase in the average water tariff of 
1998 from 2,72% to 2,96% in current money. The following table presents the targeted average 
tariff of water over the period 1999-2003 in current FCFA per cubic meter and net of tax. 
 
Objective of average tariff for water (current FCFA HT) 
Targeted average tariff HT (FCFA) except market-gardeners  Average 
Tariff 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
372,26  383,28  394,62  406,3  418,33  430,71 
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2.2 The structure of water increasing block pricing 
 
The tariff structure introduced after the sector privatization is as follows: 
-  Reduction for three of the consumers categories except market-gardeners: standposts, 
domestic consumers, non-domestic consumers (category with single block); 
-  Removal of the blocks in the non-domestic category; 
-  Maintenance of three consumption blocks for the domestic consumers, with a third 
block starting at 40 m3 a 60 days. This threshold of 40 cubic meters per two months 
exists in order that consumption of this block is not negligible: they should account 
for approximately 20% of the domestic consumer’s consumption.  
 
This tariff structure introduction used the idea of allowing a better knowledge of the 
consumption structure and of facilitating the budget projection. It envisaged the exemption of 
taxes for the social tariff. It was designed according to the “targeted average tariff” which 
corresponds to the tariff objective to reach in 2003. This latter was given by increasing annually 
by 2,96% in current money the average tariff of 1998 except market-gardeners.  
 
The table presents, in current FCFA HT, the drinking water pricing project, which was adopted 
in 1998. 
 
Water increasing block pricing (in current FCFA HT) 
Water price (FCFA per m3)  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Standposts 
Domestic consumers 
- Social block (20 m3 a 60 days) 
- Intermediate block (20-40m3) 
- Full block (+40m3) 
Non domestic consumers 






























Average tariff  352,73  372,26  383,28  394,62  406,30  418,33  430,71 
Target average tariff     383,28  394,62  406,30  418,33  430,71 
Source: Castalia, 2002. 
 
2.3 The assessment of the increasing block water tariff  
 
We can say that the policies based on an increasing block tariff structure (with social block) did 
not make it possible to the low-income populations to durably profit from a water service in 
residence. Rather, these instruments appeared ineffective in sub-Saharan Africa, or sometimes 
even generated the opposite result to the aim (Morel à l’huissier, 1990). We wonder about the 
question of the validity of this increasing block tariff such as it exists today. Indeed, the first 
block (social) was designed in order to subsidize the poorest household consumption by that of 
the richest. This principle rests on the correlation usually observed between levels of 
consumption and incomes. However, empirical examples (Collignon, Valfrey 1998) show that 
indirect effects take part in an opposite redistribution of the incomes of poorest in richest, 
contrary to the aim in view. A survey (Diagne, Briand, Cabral, 2004) that we conducted in the 
dense districts of Dakar shows that several households living in the same court divide the private 
connection and the amount of the water bill. The increasing block tariff implies that these 
households pay the water at a higher price than a richest household having its own private 
connection.  
In this case, the increasing block water pricing is not enough to fight against poverty. Then, we 
have to wonder about the basic tariff (target) on which the increasing block pricing is based. 
More precisely, the problem could stem from the choice of a targeted tariff at the average cost. 
Indeed, the targeted average price, which was introduced in 1996 and was gradually reached in   8
2003, appears high compared to other countries. It is close to that of the European countries. 
Such an average tariff is seldom met besides in West Africa (Castalia, 2002). Therefore, the switch 
to a targeted tariff at the marginal cost could decrease the price and make it possible to increase 
the access to drinking water and the household’s welfare.  
 
Although the question of the choice of the increasing block tariff structure is important in term 
of income redistribution, we focus in this paper on the choice of the basic tariff on which this 
structure is designed (average cost versus marginal cost). Our results concentrate on the sectoral 
and macroeconomic impacts and on the household’s welfare.  
 
3. Scenarios of water pricing in the CGE model: average cost versus marginal 
cost 
 
The water sector is characterized by the existence of scale economies. More precisely, it is an 
activity with increasing returns to scale, a particular case of natural monopoly. The economic 
theory teaches us that in the case of a monopoly, which produces only one type of good, the 
increasing returns to scale imply that the average cost in the long run is decreasing (scale 
economies). Therefore, the marginal cost is always lower than the average cost. The optimal 
pricing, which equalizes the price and the marginal cost, leads ineluctably to a deficit of the 
monopoly. This one must be financed by subsidies (generally financed by a tax). However, these 
subsidies aiming at reabsorbing the public monopoly deficit are badly received, even if this deficit 
is justified by the collective optimally criterion represented by the marginal cost pricing. 
Moreover, the tax levy, which makes it possible to finance the subsidies, can have negative 
consequences in terms of equity and can distort the household’s behaviour. This is why it is 
usually considered more reasonable to constrain the public monopoly with respect to budget 
equilibrium: to finance the production costs by at least equivalent receipts. We have seen 
previously that water pricing in Senegal takes note of this budget equilibrium constraint. So, we 
consider in our CGE model that the water pricing at the base run is an average cost pricing 
(budget equilibrium of the drinking water production sector).  
 
But as it is also well known from the literature, in a stylized economy (without pre-existing 
taxation), marginal cost pricing is a simple economic principle which makes it possible to ensure 
an optimal allocation of the resource between all the users. The marginal cost pricing, by giving 
maximum surplus to the consumers makes disappear the social loss and maximizes the total 
welfare. We want to simulate this water pricing scenario in our CGE model. To ensure the survival 
sector, we consider that this water pricing is accompanied by the payment of a Government 
subsidy to the water company to finance this deficit. Taking into account the pre-exiting taxation 
in our model, we don’t introduce a new tax to finance this subsidy.  
 
We examine the effects in general equilibrium (with distorsive pre-existing taxes) of both these 
water pricing cases (average cost versus marginal cost). The first allows the budget equilibrium of 
the water sector without the Government intervention via a subsidy (potential source of 
distortions). The second makes it possible to increase the total welfare of the economy.  
 
We propose a comparison of these water pricing scenarios in a sequential dynamic CGE model 
(with pre-existing taxation) taking into account the resource scarcity evolution and the water 
demand increase (population growth). We wonder about  their reallocative and redistributive 
effects in the Senegalese economy. Which of these two policies is better to the drinking water 
access, better to the fight against food insecurity (by an agricultural production growth) and 
better to conserve long-term water resources? Finally, which of these two policies generates the 
higher household welfare and total welfare?   9
4. Review of the literature on the CGE models applied to water 
 
The water management question in CGE models is little studied by the economic literature. 
Berck, Robinson and Goldman (1991) presented a first model. It was built to evaluate the 
investment policies in the water distribution in the area of San Joaquim in California. This model, 
with fourteen sectors (six agricultural sectors), was developed in order to analyze the impact of a 
water stock variation on the economy. The authors treat water like an exogenous stock, and the 
only resource consumer is the agricultural sector. The results indicate a modification in the 
production structure, with a substitution of agriculture towards the breeding. They note a fall of 
the GDP, of agricultural employment and agricultural incomes, when the quantity of available 
water decreases.  
 
The second study is that of Goldin and Roland-Holst (1995). The authors examine the relations 
between water management policies and foreign trade in Morocco using a CGE model with four 
sectors (two agricultural sectors). The two agricultural sectors are different according to area by 
distinguishing an arid region and a non-arid region. The authors examine three simulations: an 
increase of the water tariff for the farmer, a total tariff cut and the third one is a combination of 
both the previous. In the first simulation, GDP, income and household consumption, and, water 
quantity used decrease. In the second simulation, the reverse occurs. In the last simulation, the 
authors note a reduction in water quantity used and an increase in GDP, the income and the 
household consumption. In spite of interesting results, the authors impose constraining 
assumptions on their model. They use a very restrictive agricultural production function with no 
substitution between the water factor water and the intermediate consumptions. A modification 
of the water irrigation cost does not affect the farmer’s consumption decisions. However, like 
Berck et al. (1991), water is not produced, the available water quantity is fixed. Finally, water is not 
a component of household consumption. As households do not consume water, they are not in 
competition with the farmers.  
 
A third study is that of Decaluwé, Patry and Savard (1999). The authors, using a CGE 
framework, study the impact on the Moroccan economy of three water pricing systems (a 10% 
arbitrary water tariff increase, the marginal cost pricing and the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing). They 
explicitly model drinking water production with different production technologies for ground 
water or surface water (with a Weibull function). The model gives a more complete vision of 
Moroccan reality than the CGE model of Goldin and Roland-Holst (1995) because the farmers, 
industries and the households consume water. However, the authors do not concentrate on the 
specific characteristics of the water market structure (natural monopoly with increasing returns to 
scale). The model accounts for the conflict between the different water uses (domestic, 
agricultural and industrial) which appear following the pricing shocks. Their study shows that 
Ramsey-Boiteux pricing has a better impact on the water conservation in Morocco. The 
equivalent variation with the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing is much lower than that induced by the 
marginal cost pricing. Indeed, the Ramsey-Boiteux water tariff for domestic use is significantly 
higher than the marginal cost water tariff in the north of the country where the majority of the 
population lives. Moreover, the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing has a depressive effect on the 
agricultural production, which results in a strong reduction in the sector exports (agrums).  
 
A fourth study is that of Thabet (2003). He built a CGE model applied to the Tunisian 
agricultural sector in order to test two scenarii. The first comprises three simulations: a uniform 
water pricing, a 30% increase in the non-agricultural water demand and, one combination of both 
the previous. The second type of scenario consists in comparing the efficiency and the equity of 
alternative second best irrigation water pricing. Firstly, the model simulates “traditional” binomial 
average cost pricing, made up of a proportional tariff to volumetric water consumption and of a   10
fixed subscription. Secondly, the model simulates binomial “personalized” pricing where the 
fixed part of the tariff is applied to the irrigated land. The results show that a binomial 
personalized pricing of the irrigation water has positive effects on the urban household’s welfare 
and negative effects on the rural household’s welfare. However, the two other modes of pricing 
present negative impacts on the rural and urban household’s welfare. In terms of irrigation water 
management, a binomial personalized pricing appears the more adapted instrument if the 
government aims to make contribute the farmers to the financing of the hydraulic infrastructure 
without blocking the irrigation, not to affect the agricultural and food trade balance. However, if 
the water maintenance is the more important objective, average cost pricing seems to be most 
suitable. 
 
The majority of the studies, which deal with the water pricing, are concentrated on the 
agricultural water tariff question because it is generally denounced as too low. Moreover, there 
are only static models not taking into account the scale economies of the drinking water 
production sector.  
 
This is why we propose a sequential dynamic model in imperfect competition (the natural 
monopoly) which introduces an unemployment function. In an economy subjected to hydrologic 
deficits future risks, the model shows how the water pricing policies (demand management) 
affect the Senegalese economy in the short and long-term. More precisely, it describes the 
mechanisms by which evolution of the different water prices (private connection, standpost and 
informal) affects on the one hand, the sectors users of the resource (agricultural, industrial and 
services) and on the other hand, the households (Dakar, other urban and rural areas). It 
highlights the new water allocation between the different uses and more particularly, the 
substitution effects between the different modes of drinking water provisioning for intermediate 
or final consumption, by activity and household. It evaluates the impacts in short and long-term 
on unemployment, investment and total welfare of average cost versus marginal cost water pricing. 
  
 
5. The Social Accounting Matrix of Senegal (SAM, 1996) 
 
The model calibration requires construction of a Social accounting matrix (SAM) for the 
Senegalese economy.  
 
We consider that the Government holds the primary water stock, and sells it to the irrigated rice 
sector and to the drinking water production sector. The drinking water production sector 
combines this resource with labour and capital to produce higher quality water, drinking water. 
This drinking water is distributed by three channels (private connection, standposts and informal 
carters) and consumed as input by the other sectors (agricultural, industrial and services) and as a 
final good by the households.  
The SAM is composed of fifteen activities (1996) and is the database for the model. It is an 
aggregated and disaggregated version of the SAM built by Dansokho, Diouf (1999) and Cabral 
(2005). The macroeconomic data are provided by the DPS
3, by the input-output table. Incomes 
and consumption data are taken from the Senegalese Income Expenditure Household Survey 
(ESAM
4, 1996). The water data come from the SONES and the SDE (2003, 2004). The 
disagregation of the energy sector in electricity-gas, drinking water production, formal drinking 
water distribution via  the private connection, formal drinking water distribution via the standpost 
                                                 
3 DPS: Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique (Senegalese Direction of Statistics). 
4 ESAM: Enquête Sénégalaise Auprès des Ménages (Senegalese Income Expenditure Household Survey).    11
and informal drinking water distribution, stems from data resulting from surveys (Hydroconseil, 
1998; Diagne, Briand, Cabral, 2004). 
Taking into account the choice of a water intensity criterion (Appendix A1.3), the SAM 
distinguishes the intensive agricultural water sectors such as irrigated rice, rain rice, the market 
gardening, fishing, of the non-intensive agricultural water sectors. It describes a drinking water 
production sector with a public utility mission (SONES). Taking into account the importance of 
the informal operators, it integrates three drinking water distribution sectors (private connection, 
standposts and carters). Further, it distinguishes water intensive industries and services (water is 
an important input) and water non-intensive industries and services. The last sector is non-
tradable services.   
 
There are four factors of production in the economy: labour, capital, land and primary water. 
We propose to have eight households’ categories. They are defined according to their 
geographical location and according to the drinking water supply in their areas: Dakar, Other 
Urban areas (ACU), the groundnut Basin (BA), Niayes (NIAY), Casamance (CASA), the sylvo-
pastoral area (ZSP), Eastern Senegal (SO), and the Delta River (FLEUV). Six rural households’ 
categories are distinguished according to agro-ecologic areas characteristics. Indeed, rural areas 
are characterized by strong disparities in terms of agro climatic potentialities, infrastructure, 
cultivation methods, intensity in the use of production factors, sources of households income 
(Cabral, 2005) and in terms of drinking water consumption structure.   
The other agents taken into account are firms, the Government and the Rest of the world.   
 
Tables presented in Appendix 1 make it possible to synthesize the important elements of the 
SAM structure to the base run and allow to understand the different variables evolutions after the 
shock. In particular, the weight of each sector in the value added of the Senegalese economy, the 
share of the production factors in each sector, and the water intensity of the different sectors are 
important informations for the results justifications. It is the same for the structure of income 
and expenditure by household’s category. 
 
6. The model  
 
Our Senegalese model is inspired by the neo-classic model EXTER developed by Decaluwé, 
Martens and Savard (2001) but differs in many aspects. Firstly, our model is represented by four 
production factors (labour, capital, land and primary water) contrary to EXTER (labour and 
capital). The household’s typology differs. The model integrates a linear expenditure system 
(LES) in which each commodity has a minimum consumption (subsistence) whereas in EXTER, 
consumption is a fixed proportion of the available income. The transfers within households and 
between the households and the Rest of the World are explicitly taken into account.   
Taking into account the characteristics of the drinking water production sector, we integrate a 
natural monopoly with increasing returns to scale. We introduce an efficiency wage and a 
unemployment function. Lastly, it is a sequential dynamic model.  
 
The model is composed of eight blocks of equations (Appendix 2): drinking water production 
with increasing returns to scale, others sectors production in perfect competition, incomes and 
saving, taxes, demand, prices, foreign trade, and equilibrium conditions.  
 
The drinking water production (natural monopoly) is modelled in two levels. Firstly, labour is 
combined with capital by a Cobb-Douglas function to give a composite factor. Secondly, this 
composite factor is combined with the primary water by a Cobb-Douglas function with 
increasing returns to scale to give the added value. We assume that the added value is equal to the 
drinking water production, which means that there are no intermediate consumptions   12
(negligible). We compute an average cost function and a marginal cost function of drinking water 
production (see equations in Appendix 2).  
 
The other sectors’ production is modelled in two levels. At the top level, sectoral output is 
defined by a Leontief function of value added and total intermediate consumption. Then, the 
added value is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function of labour, capital,  land  and primary 
water  for the irrigated rice sector;  labour, capital  and land for the other agricultural sectors; 
labour, capital and primary water for the drinking water production sector; labour and capital  for  
all the other sectors excepted non tradable services (only labour). The intermediate consumption 
of each sector is a fixed proportion of the production of each sector. The intermediate demand 
for a product is the sum of the intermediate consumptions of this product used by the different 
sectors. A linear function connects the intermediate demand for a product to the sector 
intermediate consumption of the same product. 
   
The primary water, land, capital, and labour factors demand are determined by the first order 
conditions of profit maximization of the Cobb-Douglas production for tradable services. For 
non-tradable services, the labour factor demand is the ratio between the value added and the 
income from labour factor to the unit. 
 
Each household earns his income from production factors: labour, land, capital, and primary 
water. He also receives dividends (by firms), intra-households transfers, government transfers and 
foreigner’s transfers. The household’s disposable incomes are derived by subtracting the direct 
taxes collected by the government. We specify saving and total consumption as fixed proportions 
of disposable income.   
Firm’s income is composed by capital income. Their saving is the difference between their 
income, the direct taxes paid and the transfers paid to the other agents.  
The government receives direct taxes from households and firms, indirect taxes on domestic and 
imported goods, the remuneration of the primary water sale and transfers from households, firms 
and the Rest of the World.  
 
For each group of households, the consumption expenditure is obtained by withdrawing available 
income, saving and transfers. Domestic consumption is determined by the linear expenditure 
system (LES), in which each good has a minimum consumption (subsistence) level. 
The public consumption is the nominal production of non-tradable services.  
The nominal investment by origin is a fixed proportion of the nominal total investment. 
 
Value added price for activity is equal to the report between the nominal production net of the 
intermediate consumptions and the added value volume.  
Domestic price of imported and exported good depend on import and export world prices, the 
nominal exchange rate and receipts from import duties.   
 
The total demand (value) is the sum of demand for domestic good tax included, and the imports 
in good receipts from import duties included.   
The total production (value) is equal to the sum of the demand for domestic good and the 
exports in good evaluated at the export price. The general prices index is the GDP deflator.   
 
Domestic production is supplied to the domestic economy and export market. We assume that 
there are simultaneous export and import at the sectoral level. However, external trade shall be 
structured such that imperfect substitution characterise the foreign markets. On the import side, 
Armington (1969) approach is followed by supposing an imperfect substitution between 
domestic and imported goods. What is being demanded is the composite consumption good,   13
which is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of imports and domestically 
produced goods. For exports, the allocation of domestic output between exports and domestic 
sales is determined on the assumption that domestic producers maximise profits subject to 
imperfect transformability between both alternatives. The composite production good is thus a 
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) aggregate of exports and domestic sales. 
 
The current account balance is equal to the trade balance plus capital income received, plus 
exogenous transfer’s payments from firms and government to the Rest of the World less 
exogenous transfers from the Rest of the World to households and government.    
 
The composite commodity is equal to the total domestic absorption of consumption demand, 
intermediate demand and investment demand. 
The total supply of production factors (labour, capital, land and primary water) is equal to the 
total demand for primary factor.  
The total investment is equal to the sum of total household savings, firms savings, government 
savings and foreign savings (as represented by current account balance converted at nominal 
exchange rate), which corresponds to the neoclassical macroeconomic closure. 
 
 
Following Annabi (2003), we introduce an efficiency wage and an involuntary unemployment in 
the CGE model (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)). The equilibrium wage rate is negatively related with 
the unemployment rate() un . The labor market equilibrium is characterized by the presence of 
involuntary unemployment. The non-shirking condition (NSC) depends on the disutility of the 
effort  () ee , the exogenous quit rate () bb , the probability to be caught () qq , and the discount 
rate  () rr . The NSC is included in the model with the calibration of the parameter() ee . 
Parameters ,, bb qq rr  are respectively fixed at 0,1 ; 0,3 et 0,05.  
 
As we say above, to compare the short-term effects with the long-term effects of the average cost 
versus marginal cost pricing, we propose a dynamic approach. Indeed, the short-term effects can 
be under-estimated compared to the long-term effects.  
Dynamic general equilibrium can be classified as truly dynamic (“intertemporal”) or sequential 
dynamic (“recursive”) models. Truly dynamic models are based on optimal growth theory where 
the behaviour of economic agents is characterized by perfect foresight. Economic agents know 
all about the future and react to future changes in prices. Households maximize their 
intertemporal utility function under a wealth constraint to determine their consumption 
programm over time. Investment decisions by firms are the result of cash flow maximization 
over the whole time horizon. However, these models are still little used for the developing 
countries problems. We choose the construction of a sequential dynamic model (Annabi, 
Cockburn, Decaluwé (2004) and Annabi, Cissé, Cockburn and Decaluwé (2005)). 
 
This kind of dynamic model is not the result of intertemporal optimization by economic agents. 
Indeed, these agents have myopic behaviour. A sequential dynamic model is basically a series of 
static CGE models that are linked between periods by an exogenous and endogenous variable 
updating procedure. Capital stock is updated endogenously with a capital accumulation equation 
and population (total labour supply) is updated exogenously between periods. The crucial 
question concerns the distribution of new investments between sectors and the capital stock 
calibration.  
  
The sequential dynamic model is formulated as a static model, which is solved sequentially over 
time. We use the static model, index all variables in time (t) and introduce the following 
equations.   14
The capital accumulation equation (69)
5 described the law of the motion for the sectoral capital 
stock. It supposes implicitly that the stocks are measured at the beginning of the period and that 
the flows are measured at the end of the period.  
The investment demand function (71) determines how the new investment will be distributed 
between different sectors. It is a rate of investment by sector of destination. The investment 
demand function
6 used is similar to the one proposed by Bourguignon, Branson and De Mello 
(1989). Parameters  1TR γ  et 2TR γ  are positive parameters calibrated on the bias of the investment 
elasticity and the investment equilibrium equation (74).  The investment rate (ratio between the 
investment by sector destination  , TR T IND  and the capital stock  , TR T KD ) is increasing with the 
respect to the ratio of the rate of return to capital  , TR T r  and its user cost
7  T U .  
In introducing investment by destination, we have to respect the equality condition with total 
investment by origin in the original SAM. The parameters  1TR γ  et 2TR γ  are positive only if the 















 is between 1 and 2. Following Annabi et 







= γγ  this relation, taken together with the investment demand equation, makes it 
possible to calibrate  1TR γ  et 2TR γ . We make assumptions on the sectoral growth rates of capital as 
data is not generally available on investment by destination in developing countries. Possible 
assumptions include (Annabi et al. (2004)): 
1)  It is equal to the production growth rate 
2)  It is equal to the sum of population growth rate and capital depreciation rate
8. 
In our application, we fixed the sectoral growth rates of capital at 5% in order to calibrate the 
capital stock. 
The capital user cost (72) is equal to the replacement capital price (price index of investment) 
multiplied by the sum of capital depreciation rate and real interest rate (exogenous). Total labour 
supply (70) is an endogenous variable although it simply increases at the exogenous population 
growth.  
 
The model is solved simultaneously as a system of non linear equations on a 20-period time 
horizon.  
 
There are some equilibrium conditions to be satisfied in the model (closure). The nominal 
exchange rate is chosen as numeraire. It is fixed taking into account the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union agreements. Since this “small country” has no impact on international 
markets, the world prices with the import and export are exogenous. The public expenditure is 
fixed. The other exogenous variables of the model are dividends, land supply,  primary water 
demands and transfers between the different agents. 
 
Calibration is usual step in the construction of CGE models. In order to make the model 
operational, it is necessary specify the parameters value. Elasticities of the household’s 
                                                 
5 See Appendix 2 (Model equations). 
6 See Bchir, Decreux, Guerin and Jean (2002) and Jung and Thorbecke (2000) for other examples of investment 
functions. 
7 Hall and Jorgenson (1967). 








 which is used in intertemporal dynamic models.   15
consumption functions and elasticity of the import and export demands are taken from 
Decaluwé et al. (2001), and Cabral (2005). All the other parameters come from the Senegalase 
SAM. The model counts 13 306 equations for 13 306 endogenous variables and 2 255 exogenous 
variables. The model is solved (calibration and simulations) using Gams
9.  
 
In static models, counterfactual analysis is made with respect to the base run that is represented 
by the initial SAM. But in the dynamic models, the economy grows even without a policy shock 
and the analysis should be done with respect to the growth path in the absence of any shock. (see 
graphs in Appendix 9).  Sectoral and macro effects are presented in tables of Appendix 7 and 8. 
These tables report the percentage variation between the base path and the after simulation path 
for each variable.  
 
7. Simulation results of climatic shocks combined with average cost versus 
marginal cost pricing 
 
The same climatic shock is simulated in two scenarios. It represents the long-term evolution of the 
water resource availability, which we describe in section 1. We simulate a first phase of resource 
availability increase (policy of water supply increase), followed by a stability phase, and a third 
phase characterized by hydrologic deficit (water demand increase and population growth). More 
precisely, we simulate a 30% water resource increase for the first three periods followed by a 30% 
decrease of the resource availability over periods 7, 8 and 9. The other periods are characterized 
by climatic stability. We observe the impacts on a 20-year horizon (1996-2015) of this climatic 
variability, by comparing the results to the long-term trend without shock (see graphics in 
Appendix 9, 10 and 11).    
 
The simulations are distinguished by the water pricing policy (water demand management) 
combined with climatic shocks. The first scenario is with average cost pricing. The second is a 
marginal cost pricing combined with a subsidy financed by the Government to the drinking water 
production sector. We compare the short and long-term effects of these two policies on the 
Senegalese economy. We wonder about the water policy which gives the most welfare. 
 
7.1 Climatic shocks combined with average cost pricing (see Appendix 7) 
 
In the short run (1996): 
 
In the short run, the rise of the primary resource availability (allowed by the supply increase) 
benefits directly drinking water production and the irrigated rice sectors. Firstly, it involves a 
decrease of the average cost, marginal cost, producer and consumer prices of - 35,6%.  The fall of 
the drinking water input cost profits directly to the drinking water sectors. Indeed the producer 
and consumer water prices (private connection and standpost) decrease respectively by - 10,82% 
and - 9,24%.  
The rise of the quantity of primary water available generates a production increase of irrigated 
rice (+8,92%), drinking water produced (+2,9%), drinking water distribution via private 
connection (+1,78%) and via standposts (+9,38%). Taking into account the Leontief production 
function of these sectors, their respective intermediate consumptions increase in the same 
proportions. There is an effect on the other sectors. Nevertheless, their production increases 
lower (except fishing and water intensive industry). There is an expansion of the sectors, which 
answers a demand rise via its three components: intermediate demand, final consumption and 
                                                 
9 General Algebraic Modeling System, Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus, (1996). 
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investment demand. This demand increase is illustrated by an imports increase (except for 
irrigated rice whose local production is enough to answer the demand). Firstly, it is explained by 
the intermediate demand rise related to the sectors expansion and the drinking water price 
decrease. Secondly, it is explained by an income rise of the agents. The agent’s income increases 
taking into account the factor remunerations rise. Wages and the rate of return to agricultural 
land increase respectively by +0,67% and +0,43%. Rate of return to capital also increases in all 
the sectors (except in irrigated rice and drinking water production). In these two last sectors, 
primary water replaces the other factors (labour, capital and land) absorbed by the other sectors, 
which can ensure their expansion. Drinking water distribution sectors profit largely from the 
labour transfer, in particular the labour intensive sector (standposts). The other agricultural 
sectors profit from the land release by irrigated rice. After the irrigated rice, market-gardening is 
the agricultural sector which is the most in expansion, taking into account the fall of the water 
input cost. It monopolizes most of the land (+1,1%, +0,86% and +0,3% respectively for the 
market gardening, rain rice and other agriculture). The export demand for irrigated rice and 
market gardening grow respectively of +23,9% and +0,37%.  
The intensive water sectors expansion results in a rise of their investment by destination: 
+1,61%, +2,48%, +15,79% and +42,22%, respectively for the market gardening, energy, private 
connection and standposts.  
    
In the short run, the climatic shock combined with the maintenance of the current water pricing 
policy (average cost) generates a welfare rise for all the households except those of the River (-
0,07%). The welfare increase for the urban households is more important (+0,51% for Dakar and 
+0,23% for the other urban areas) than for rural (+0,02% on average).  
 
In terms of macroeconomics impacts, although government saving drops (because the shock 
generates a primary water remuneration fall), total investment increases by +1,03%. This is 
explained by the rise of the other agents savings (households and firms), related to their income 
rise, resulting from the other factors remuneration increase. Thus, the total welfare increases by 
+0,81% (incomes and consumption rise) and the unemployment rate decreases by - 0,9% thanks 
to the Senegalese economy expansion. In terms of drinking water distribution, the policy of 
supply increase generates, in the short run, a substitution of the standposts (+9,38%) to the 
private connection (+1,78%) and, a substitution of the formal to informal (+0,56%).  
 
In the long-term (2015): 
 
Ten years after the hydrologic deficit shock, the average cost, marginal cost and the producer and 
consumer prices of drinking water increase by +17,88%. This results in an increase of the 
drinking water input cost for the users sectors. This fall of the resource availability generates a 
production decrease of drinking water (-3,61%) and irrigated rice (-13,9%). The drinking water 
production decrease combined with the drinking water price increase generates a production fall 
of the intensive water sectors (-0,54%; -0,58%; -0,77%; -0,79%; -0,99%; -2,48% and -10,1% 
respectively for intensive water industry and tradable services, energy, drinking water informal 
distribution, market-gardening, private connection and standposts). The drinking water 
distribution is very affected. Taking into account the fall in the same proportions of their 
intermediate consumptions, the other sectors slow down. The production decrease of irrigated 
rice is partly compensated by the imports rise (+6,63%). The same does not hold for the other 
goods and services whose imports decrease. This implies a domestic demand contraction that 
must be explained. In the irrigated rice, the primary water availability decrease is compensated by 
an increase in the other factors demand. Labour, capital and land replace primary water. Their 
respective demand increases by +0,83%, +0,44% and +0,61%. The demand rise for land by 
irrigated rice is possible to the detriment of the other agricultural sectors, especially of the   17
market-gardening because it is very water intensive (very affected by the water price increase). 
After irrigated rice, the agricultural sector is the most affected. In the drinking water production 
sector, the primary water availability decrease is compensated by an increase in labour and capital 
factors demand (+24,35% and +23,38%) to the detriment of the other sectors. This decrease in 
the factors demand by the other sectors is made possible by their contraction. 
 
In the long-term, we observe a household’s welfare loss except Niayes (constant) and River, 
which increases slightly. The welfare loss of the urban households (-0,44% for Dakar and -0,21% 
for the other urban areas) is stronger than that of rural (- 0,03% on average). 
 
In terms of long-term macroeconomics impacts, we observe a sectors contraction. The primary 
water remunerations increase involves a rise of the governmental saving. However, the other 
factors’ remunerations decrease (wages, rate of return to capital) generates a decrease of the other 
agent’s income and saving. Thus, the investment and the total welfare decrease (-1,06% and -
0,77%). The unemployment rate increases (+0,85%). In term of drinking water distribution, the 
distribution via standposts are more affected by the hydric deficit (-10,1%) than the distribution 
via private connection (-2,48%). The informal water distribution is less affected (-0,79%) because 
it is a regulation sector of the scarcity.      
 
7.2 Climatic shocks combined with marginal cost pricing (see Appendix 8) 
 
We suppose that the Government decides to practice marginal cost water pricing. Indeed, we 
have seen that the producer is in natural monopoly and at the base year, the water price is an 
average cost tariff. We suppose that the drinking water production price is not equal any more to 
its average cost (1 at the basic year) but equal to its marginal cost. This policy poses problem 
because for the monopoly it implies a loss. This loss (equal to the difference of sales between the 
average cost and the marginal cost on total volume) risks making it disappear in the long-term. 
This is why, to maintain the survival of the monopoly, the Government subsidies it to 
compensate for this loss. Through this simulation, we want to observe whether the total welfare 
of the Senegalese economy increases (although it undergoes climatic shocks).   
 
In the short run (1996): 
 
The resource availability rise, allowed by the policies of supply increase combined with marginal 
cost pricing, involves a fall of the drinking water average and marginal production costs of -
32,36%. The drinking water producer and consumer prices decrease more than in the first scenario 
(-47,97% against -35,6%). It follows from there a stronger fall of the drinking water input cost 
for the users sectors. Indeed, the prices of drinking water distributed by the private connection 
and on the standposts drop more than in the first scenario (respectively -14% against - 10,82% and 
-12% against -9,24%). The rise of the drinking water sectors production is also accentuated 
(+4,01% against +2,9% for the drinking water production, +2,45% against +1,78% for the 
distribution  via the private connection, +13% against +9,38% for the distribution via the 
standposts). This means that the rise of their intermediate consumptions has moved in 
proportion stronger than in the first scenario with a driving effect on the other sectors more 
important too. This is why the other sectors production increase is more important. 
This supply rises because demand rises. Indeed, the intensive water sectors’ expansion, via the 
intermediate demand rise and the drinking water price decrease, explains the total demand 
increase. This increase in total demand is possible because the agent’s income increases. Indeed, 
rise in factorial remunerations is more important than in the first scenario: The wage rate and the 
rate of return to agricultural land grow respectively at +1,13% against +0,67% and +0,88% 
against +0,43%. The rate of return of capital increases more in all the sectors except in irrigated   18
rice and in the drinking water production sectors where it decreases with the first scenario. These 
changes in factorial remunerations are explained by the fact that in the irrigated rice and drinking 
water production sectors, primary water replaces the other factors absorbed by the other sectors 
growth. The labour demand increases in the drinking water distribution sectors (private 
connection and standposts) are more important (respectively +13,9% and +36,53% against 
+9,95% and +25,65%). In the agricultural sectors, the released land by irrigated rice (-1,38% 
against -1,29% in the first scenario) is more monopolized by rain rice (+1,21% against +0,86%) 
and the market-gardening (+1,4% against +1,1%) than in the first scenario.  
The increase in investments by destination is also more important for rain rice, market-gardening, 
other agricultural sectors, non-intensive water industry, energy, drinking water distribution via 
private connection and standposts, and services. More particularly, the investment in the private 
connection sector increases by +22,4% against +15,79% and, +62,26% against +42,22% in 
standposts sector. The effect of a marginal cost pricing is more beneficial in terms of investments 
in the drinking water distribution sectors.  
In the short-run, the climatic shock combined with the marginal cost pricing generates an 
improvement of all the households welfares except that of the River (-0,05%). This welfare 
increase is, as in the first scenario, stronger for the urban (+0,68% for Dakar and +0,31% for the 
other urban areas) than for the rural (+0,4% on average), but in greater proportions. This means 
that a marginal cost pricing accentuates the short run beneficial effects of the shock (policy of 
water supply increase) on the household’s welfare. 
In terms of macroeconomics impacts, marginal cost water pricing induces lower primary water 
remunerations. The Government’s subsidy ensuring budget equilibrium of the drinking water 
production sector generates a Government saving degradation from -5,82% against -1,89% when 
it does not intervene in the first scenario. However, this does not stop the total investment. On the 
contrary, the total investment increases more (+1,84% against +1,03%) than in the first scenario. 
This is explained by the other agents’ savings increase, which more than compensates for the fall 
of the Government saving. With marginal cost pricing, the more important economy expansion 
generates a more important increase in total welfare (+1,11% against +0,81%) and a more 
important reduction in unemployment rate (-1,5% against -0,9%). In terms of drinking water 
distribution, we observe the same results as in the first scenario even if those are accentuated. 
Following the policy of supply increase, we observe a substitution of standposts (+13%) to the 
private connection (+2,45%), which means strong development of the standposts network and, a 
substitution of formal for informal (+0,74%).  
 
In the long-term (2015):  
 
In the long-term, marginal cost water pricing makes it possible to absorb the negative effects on 
the economy of the hydrologic deficit shock. The average and marginal costs of drinking water 
production increase by +19,59%. But the producer and consumer prices of drinking water 
production decrease by -7,82% while they increased by +17,88% in the first scenario. The long-
term trends of the economy are completely reversed according to the water pricing government 
policy (average cost versus marginal cost). This result is interesting because it shows that in the 
long-term, a marginal cost water pricing is still much more beneficial than in the short run. The 
analysis of the evolution of the other aggregates demonstrates it.  
In spite of the resource scarcity shock, the drinking water production price decreases. Therefore, 
we observe a fall of the drinking water input cost for water intensive sectors. Indeed, the drinking 
water distribution prices via private connection and standposts decrease respectively by -2,96% 
and -2,91% while in the first scenario (average cost pricing), they increased respectively by +7,36% 
and +7,4%. 
In consequence, sectoral effects become completely different. Outputs of the drinking water 
production sector, drinking water distribution sectors (private connection, standposts) and   19
market-gardening increase respectively by +1,36%, +0,8%, +4,63% and +0,11% while they 
decreased respectively by -3,61%, -2,48%, -10,1% and -0,99% in the first scenario. These results 
are very interesting because we observe a positive driving effect on the majority of the other 
sectors whose production increases via intermediate consumptions. The irrigated rice production 
decreases as in the first scenario (-13,9%). Only the productions of fishing, other agriculture and 
intensive water industry decrease but, in less proportions.  
The expansion of most of the sectors explains the increase in factorial remunerations. The wage 
rate and the rate of return to agricultural land respectively increase (+0,29% and +0,5%) while 
they respectively decreased (-0,55% and -0,89%) in the first scenario. This rise in factorial 
remuneration justifies the expansion of the sectors by rise in the three demand components 
(intermediate, final and investment demands). In fact, the agents’ income and saving increase 
except government saving which falls (-9,74% against a rise of +0,08% in the first scenario) 
because of the subsidy to the drinking water production sector. But this government saving fall is 
more than compensated by the other savings increase. So, the long-term total investment 
increases (+0,79%) whereas it decreased (-1,06%) in the first scenario.  
In the long-term, the hydrologic shock combined with marginal cost pricing allows households to 
maintain welfare in the sylvopastoral area. It permits the household’s welfare of River (+0,04%) 
to increase. The rise is more important than in the first scenario. As in the first scenario, the shock 
generates a decrease of all the other household’s welfare, stronger for the urban (-0,1% for Dakar 
and -0,07% for the other urban areas) that for the rural (-0,15% on average), but in less 
proportions. This means that marginal cost pricing mitigates the negative effect of the water 
shortages on the household’s welfare.  
 
Finally in the long-term, the resource scarcity shock combined with the marginal cost water 
pricing, affects the total welfare less than in the average cost water pricing (-0,18% against -
0,77%). The expansion of most of the sectors, allowed by the water price decrease, reopens the 
economic activity and decreases the unemployment rate (-0,43%) while this last increased by 
+0,85% in the first scenario. In terms of drinking water distribution, we observe an opposite trend 
to the first scenario.  Indeed, the hydrologic deficit combined with a marginal cost pricing allows in 
the long-term an expansion of the drinking water distribution with a substitution of the 
standposts (+4,63%) to the private connection (+0,8%). It is explained by the investment 
dynamic. Contrary to the first scenario, investments in the water sectors increase (respectively 
+33%, +2,06% and +7,26% for the drinking water production, distribution via the private 
connection and standposts against +24,17%, - 2,25% and - 10,7%). Contrary to the first 





Our dynamic CGE model applied to the Senegalese economy makes it possible to simulate in the 
short run a first phase of resource availability increase (policy of supply increase), followed by a 
phase of hydrologic deficits in accordance with the above projections. These climatic shocks are 
combined with two cases of water demand policy (average cost versus marginal cost pricing).  
 
The results show that if in the short run, marginal cost pricing is more beneficial than average 
cost pricing, it positively amplifies the effects without reversing them. In fact, in both cases, the 
increase in the short term of the primary resource availability generates an economy expansion 
with a decrease of the unemployment rate, a rise of total investment and welfare. In both cases, 
the drinking water distribution via the standposts grows more than that with the private 
connection and, the formal one replaces the informal one. The agricultural sectors expansion is 
stronger when the policy of supply increase is accompanied by a marginal cost pricing. This   20
pricing policy is better for the fight against the food insecurity. Finally, the household’s welfare 
increases more in this second scenario.  
In the long-term, the results are more interesting because they show that the effects of a marginal 
cost water pricing are more beneficial. Indeed, in the presence of hydrologic deficits, it makes it 
possible to better manage the water scarcity by completely reversing the long-term economic 
trend induced by an average cost water pricing More precisely, the total investment increases 
whereas it decreased in the first scenario. Following the resource scarcity shock, the total welfare 
falls less than in the first case. More particularly, marginal cost water pricing makes it possible to 
mitigate the negative effects of the water shortages on the household’s welfare. The expansion of 
most of the sectors allowed by marginal cost pricing reopens the economic activity by decreasing 
the unemployment rate while this latter increased with an average cost pricing. In spite of the 
water shortage, marginal cost pricing makes it possible to increase in the long-term the 
agricultural production of rain rice and market gardening whereas all the agricultural sectors 
production decreases with average cost pricing. This reform would also be better for the fight 
against food insecurity in the long-term. In term of supply drinking water, we observe an 
opposite trend to the first scenario when the hydrologic deficit is combined with marginal cost 
pricing. It allows an expansion of drinking water distribution (private connection and standposts) 
thanks to the investments dynamics, which increases the household’s access to the service. 
Finally, the informal water sector does not play the role of shortage regulator any more.  
 
To sum up, in the long-term, marginal cost water pricing allows better management of resource 
scarcity and permits reduction of food insecurity even if the government subsidises the drinking 
water production sector. It mitigates the negative effects of water shortages because it decreases 
the water input cost (related to the passage of average cost pricing with marginal cost pricing). 
Combined with the total investment rise, it reopens the economy and improves the household’s 
welfare. This result goes against the directives of international organizations that impose budget 
equilibrium to the water companies. These directives could be negative for a long-term economy 
subjected to future hydrologic deficit. Lastly, it questions the basic tariff (average cost) on which 
the increasing block water pricing is based in Senegal.  
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Appendices:        
Appendix 1: Table A1 .1: Share of value-added in the sectors production 
















Irrigated rice  92328  1,89 84148  3,23  91,14
Rain rice  4168  0,09 1847  0,07  44,31
Market gardening  89348  1,83 76328  2,93  85,43
Fishing  150585  3,09 119474  4,58  79,34
Other agriculture  452156  9,27 348243  13,36  77,02
Water intensive industry  573445  11,76 243892  9,36  42,53
Water non intensive industry  979654  20,09 237378  9,11  24,23
Other energy  70079  1,44 31114  1,19  44,40
Drinking water production (SONES)  29618  0,61 29618  1,14  100,00
Water distribution by private connection (SDE)  78880  1,62 36261  1,39  45,97
Water distribution by standposts (SDE)  13311  0,27 5157  0,20  38,74
Water informal distribution   7593  0,16 7513  0,29  98,95
Water intensive tradable services   980868  20,12 598784  22,97  61,05
Water non intensive tradable services  1041775  21,37 617927  23,70  59,31
Non tradable services  311910  6,40 169076  6,49  54,21
Total  4875718  100,00 2606760  100,00  53,46
Source: SAM, 1996 
 
A1.2 table: Share of factors in Value-added (%) 











Irrigated rice  84148 12,28  44,48  9,46  33,78  100 
Rain rice  1847 57,34  30,54  12,13  0  100 
Market gardening  76328 59,29  35,83  4,88  0  100 
Fishing  119474 53,72  46,28  0  0  100 
Other agriculture  348243 61,43  32,75  5,81  0  100 
Water intensive industry  243892 18,63  81,37  0  0  100 
Water non intensive industry  237378 32,91  67,09  0  0  100 
Other energy  31114 17,91  82,09  0  0  100 
Drinking water production (SONES)  29618 14,82  53,16  0  32,02  100 
Water distribution by private connection (SDE)  36261 18,55  81,45  0  0  100 
Water distribution by standposts (SDE)  5157 39,25  60,75  0  0  100 
Water informal distribution   7513 88,65  11,35  0  0  100 
Water intensive tradable services   598784 44,20  55,80  0  0  100 
Water non intensive tradable services  617927 22,88  77,12  0  0  100 
Non tradable services  169076 100  0  0  0  100 
Total  2606760 40,62  56,69  1,23  1,45  100 
Source: SAM, 1996 
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A1.3 table: Water intensity of sectors



































Irrigated rice  0  0  0  0  8180  0 
Rain rice  0  0  0  0  2321  0 
Market gardening  0  4771  1443  1443  13020  58,8 
Fishing  0  222  0  44  31111  0,86 
Other agriculture  0  0  0  0  103913  0 
Water intensive industry  0  17380  0  0  329553  5,3 
Water non intensive industry  0  10380  0  0  742276  1,4 
Other energy  0  1791  0  0  38965  4,6 
Drinking water production (SONES)  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Water distribution by private connection 
(SDE) 
32969  0  0  0  42619  77 
Water distribution by standposts (SDE)  5742  0  0  0  8154  70,4 
Water informal distribution   0  0  80  0  80  100 
Water intensive tradable services   0  10051  0  0  382084  2,6 
Water non intensive tradable services   0  4459  0  0  423848  1,05 
Non tradable services   0  2040  0  0  142834  1,43 
Total  38711  51094  1523  1487  2268958  4,1 
Source: SAM, 1996 
 
A1.4 table: Households income according to the source (in %) 
  Dakar  ACU  BA  NIAY  CASA  ZSP  SO  FLEUV 
Factors           
Labour  39,35  36  13,64  40  22,85  16,70  61,83  14,97 
Capital  35,47  40,5  43,21  27,22  36,81  34,60  15,37  33,98 
Land  0  0  6,61  2,94  7,31  3,9  3,32  3,60 
Primary water  0  0  0  0  3,48  0  0  22,29 
Transfers           
Households  17,45  15,3  17,85  17,45  15,18  30,16  13,36  15,92 
Firms  5,14  4  7,70  5,03  5,74  5,11  2,32  3,64 
Government 0,45  0,85  0,09  0,23  0,50  2,28  0,51  0,44 
Rest of World  2,14  3,35  10,90  7,13  8,13  7,25  3,29  5,16 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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A1.5 table: Household’s expenses (in %)
  Dakar  ACU  BA  NIAY  CASA  ZSP  SO  FLEU
V 
Total income  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Households transfers  17,07  23,96  4,21  1,58  0,17  0,00  41,65  1,07 
Direct taxes   2,31  2,49  1,97  1,29  0,00  0,00  0,60  0,00 
Final Consumption  41,25  45,58  93,82  97,13  96,35  100  57,75  76,65 
Irrigated rice  9,98  10,74  13,90  16,29  17,76  13,19  13,95  15,05 
Rain rice  0,00  0,00  0,12  0,00  2,31  0,00  1,92  0,00 
Market gardening  5,18  5,34  6,51  6,31  5,57  6,11  5,29  5,61 
Fishing  5,24  4,77  5,26  4,68  4,80  4,34  5,96  4,06 
Other agriculture  8,89  9,30  20,84  14,58  25,42  17,48  15,01  25,35 
Water intensive industry  16,72  15,46  10,94  16,38  14,45  21,73  17,00  11,86 
Water non intensive industry  22,39  20,70  16,62  21,92  10,41  18,34  18,29  19,17 
Other energy  1,78  1,65  2,27  1,74  1,54  2,31  1,81  2,16 
Drinking water production   0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
Water via private connection  2,68  0,66  2,54  1,20  0,81  2,67  1,00  0,28 
Water via standposts  0,05  0,05  0,23  0,29  0,01  0,29  0,06  0,01 
Water informal  0,55  0,14  0,55  0,30  0,16  0,60  0,21  0,06 
Water intensive tradable service  5,97  7,01  5,48  3,95  3,77  5,94  4,38  3,68 
Water non intensive trad service  20,57  24,18  14,74  12,36  12,99  7,00  15,12  12,71 
Non tradable service  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
Saving  39,37  27,97  0,00  0,00  3,48  0,00  0,00  22,28 
Source: SAM, 1996 
 
 




Production of drinking water (natural monopoly with increasing returns to scale) 
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(6)      WAT WAT PV P =  
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 (11)          () WAT WAT WAT WAT SUB CM Cm VA =−  
 
Production of the other sectors (perfect competition) 
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(16)      NTR NTR VA LD =   
                           
(17)      K KK CI io XS =  
                             
(18)      ,, TR K TR K K DI aij CI =                          
 
(19)      () / NWAT NWAT NWAT NWAT LDP V V A w α =          
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(24)      () / IRG IRG IRG IRG T TD PV VA r χ =                                                                                  
                                                   
(25)     () () 2 1/ IRG IRG IRG IRG IRG IRG EDP V V A r e αβχ = −−−                    
 
Income and saving 
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Taxes  
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Demand 
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(42)     SNM SNM GPX S =  
                                    
International trade 
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Labour market (unemployment) 
 (63)     j
j
LS LD unLS =+ ∑   
(64)     (/) * (/ ) we e e e q q b b u nr r =+ +                                Efficiency wage 
 
Other equilibrium conditions 
 
(65)     , good good good H good
H
QD I T C I N V =+ + ∑                   
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H
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Dynamic equations        
 
(69)       () ,1 , , 1 TR T TR T TR T KD KD IND δ + =− +                         Capital accumulation  
 (70)      () 1 1 TT LS n LS + =+                                                   Labour force growth 
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                      Investment demand 
(72)       () TT UP k i r δ =+                                                    Capital user cost 
 (73)      () , TT R T T R
TR
Pk Pc µ =∑                                               Capital replacement price 
 (74)       , TT R T
TR
IT Pk IND = ∑                                     Investment equilibrium 
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Appendix 3: Endogenous Variables                     
 
WAT SUB  : Government subsidy to drinking water production sector WAT 
WAT KL  : Composite capital-labour in the drinking water production sector WAT 
KL P  : Composite factor price in the drinking water production sector WAT 
WAT CM  : Average cost of the drinking water production WAT 
WAT Cm  : Marginal cost of the drinking water production WAT 
WAT CT  : Total cost of the drinking water production WAT 
 
Price 
w : Wage rate 
TR r  : Rate of return to capital TR  
T U  : Capital user cost 
T Pk  : Capital replacement price (price index of investment)     
T r  : Rate of return to agricultural land                        
1 re  : Rate of return to primary water in the irrigated rice sector 
2 re  : Rate of return to primary water in the drinking water production sector   
i P  :  Producer price of good I  
i PV  : Value added price for activity J  
TR Pd  : Domestic price of good TR including taxes            
TR Pc  : Consumer price of composite good TR        
TRX Pe  : Domestic price of exported good TRX              
TRX Pm  : Domestic price of imported good TRX                
TR Pl  : Domestic price of good TR (excluding taxes) 
index P  : GDP deflator   
  
Production  
I VA  : Value added for activity J (volume)                                          
j XS  : Output of activity J (volume)   
K CI  : Total intermediate consumption of activity K (volume)                
, TR K DI  : Intermediate consumption of good TR in activity K  
    
Factors 
I LD  : Activity J demand for labour (volume)  
T LS  : Total labour supply (volume) 
un  : Unemployment rate                          
: TR KD Activity TR demand for capital (volume)                    
AGR TD  : Agricultural activity AGR demand for land (volume)       
 
Demand 
, TR H C  : Household H’s consumption of good TR (volume)            29
H CTM  : Household H’s total consumption (value)       
TR DIT  : Intermediate demand for good TR (volume)               
TR INV  : Investment demand for good TR or by origin (volume) 
, TR T IND  : Demand for capital in activity TR (volume)         
IT  : Total investment    
tr D  : Demand for domestic good TR (volume)                      
tr Q  : Demand for composite good TR (volume)   
      
International trade             
TRX EX  : Exports in good TRX (volume)                    
TRX M  : Imports in good TRX (volume)            
  
Income and saving 
H YM  : Household H’s income 
H YDM  : Household H’s disposable income   
YE : Firm’s income                                                                                     
YG  : Government’s income (value)   
H SM  : Household H’s savings             
SE  : Firms’ savings                           
SG : Government’s savings           
TDE : Receipts from direct taxation on firms’ income                     
H TDM  : Receipts from direct taxation on household H’s income               
TR TI  : Receipts from indirect tax on TR (value)    
TRX TIM  : Receipts from import duties TRX (value)                     
                                                            
Appendix 4: Exogenous variables  
    
H DIV  : Dividend paid to households H 
G  : Public consumption (value)   
TS  : Total supply of land 
WAT ED  : Activity WAT demand for primary water (volume) 
IRG ED  : Activity IRG demand for primary water (volume) 
H TGM  : Public transfers to household H 
TGW  : Public transfers to the rest of the world           
, H H RTF  : Household H’s transfers to household H’s  
H TWM  : Rest of the world transfers to household H’s       
TWG  : Rest of the world transfers to government             
TEW  : Dividends paid to the Rest of the world 
TRX Pwm  : World price of import TRX 
TRX Pwe  : World price of export TRX 
e : Nominal exchange rate 
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Appendix 5: Parameters  
 
Unemployment function 
ee : Effort disutility 
bb  : Exogenous probability to be fired 
qq : Probability of detection of shirking 




TRX A  : Scale coefficient (CES function between imports and domestic production) 
m
TRX α  : Share parameter (CES function between imports and domestic production) 
m
TRX σ  : Substitution elasticity (CES function between imports and domestic production) 
m
TRX ρ  : Substitution parameter (CES function between imports and domestic production) 
e
TRX B  : Scale coefficient (CET function between domestic production and exports) 
e
TRX β  : Share parameter (CET function between domestic production and exports) 
e
TRX τ  : Transformation elasticity (CET function between domestic production and exports) 
e
TRX κ  : Transformation parameter (CET function between domestic production and exports) 
, TR j aij  : Input-output coefficient  
KL
NWAT A  : Scale coefficient (Cobb-Douglas production function) NWAT (capital-labour) 
KL
WAT A  : Scale coefficient (Cobb-Douglas composite production function ) WAT (capital-labour) 
KLT
NIRG A  : Scale coefficient (Cobb-Douglas function of value added) NIRG (capital-labour-land) 
KLE
WAT A  : Scale coefficient (Cobb-Douglas function of value added with increasing returns to 
scale) WAT (capital-labour composite and primary water) 
WAT s  : Scale parameter mesuring increasing returns to scale WAT 
KLTE
IRG A  : Scale coefficient (Cobb-Douglas function of value added) IRG (capital-labour-land-
primary water) 
NTR A  : Scale coefficient (production function of non tradable services) NTR 
KL
WAT α  : Share of labour (Cobb-Douglas production function of the composite factor capital-
labour) WAT  
KLE
WAT α  : Share of the composite factor capital-labour (Cobb-douglas production function) 
WAT  
I α  : Elasticity (Cobb-Douglas production function) I 
Kl
WAT β  : Share of capital (Cobb-Douglas production function of the composite factor capital-
labour) WAT  
TR β  : Share of labour (Cobb-Douglas function of value added) TR  
IRG χ  : Share of primary water (Cobb-Douglas function of value added) IRG 
TR io  : Technical coefficient (Leontief production function) (intermediate consumption 
coefficient) 
TR v  : Technical coefficent (Leontief production function) (value added coefficient) 
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Tax rates 
TR tx  : Tax rate on good TR 
TRX tm  : Import duties on good TR 
H ty  : Direct tax rate on household H’s income  
e ty  : Direct tax rate on firms’ income 
 
Other parameters  
, TR H C  : Household H’s minimum consumption of good TR  
, TR H γ  : Marginal share of good TR 
H w λ  : Share of labour income received by household H 
H r λ  : Share of capital income received by household H 
H l λ  : Share of land income received by household H 
WAT λ  : Share of primary water income received by government  
H WAT λ  : Share of primary water income received by households  
re λ  : Share of capital income received by firms 
row λ  : Share of capital income received by foreigners  
H φ  : Propensity to save by household H 
TR µ  : Share of the value of good TR in total investment 
j δ  : Share of activity J in total value added 
 
 
n : Population growth rate 
δ  : Capital depreciation rate 
ir  : Real interest rate 
1TR γ  : Parameter in the investment demand function 
2TR γ  : Parameter in the investment demand function 
 
Appendix 6: Sets  
 
{ } ,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , i j I RI RP MA PEC AA IIE INIE EG PE BP BF DIE SMIE SMNIE SNM ∈=  
  All activities and goods (RI   : Irrigated rice,RP :  Rain  rice,MA :  Market 
gardening,PEC  : Fishing,  AA : Other agriculture, IIE  : Water intensive industry, INIE  : Water 
non-intensive industry, EG  : Other energy,  PE : Drinking water production (SONES), BP : 
Drinking water distribution via the private connection (SDE), BF  : Drinking water distribution 
via the standpost (SDE), DIE  : Informal drinking water distribution, SMIE  : Water intensive 
tradable services, SMNIE   : Water non-intensive non-tradable services, SNM  :  Non-tradable 
services ). 
{ } ,,, ,,, ,,,, , , , K I RI RP MA PEC AA IIE INIE EG BP BF DIE SMIE SMNIE SNM ∈=  
  All activities and goods of I except PE 
{ } ,,, ,,, ,,,,, , , TR I RI RP MA PEC AA IIE INIE EG PE BP BF DIE SMIE SMNIE ∈=  
  Tradable activities and goods 
{ } ,,, ,,, ,,,,, Good TR RI RP MA PEC AA IIE INIE EG PE BP BF DIE ∈=  
 Tradable  goods   32
{ } ,, ,,,,, , , N A G T R P E CI I EI N I EE GP EB PB FD I ES M I ES M N I E ∈=  
  Non-agricultural tradable activities and goods 
{ } ,,, AGR TR RI RP MA AA ∈=  
  Agricultural activities and goods  
{ } IRG AGR RI ∈= 
  Irrigated activity and good 
{ } ,, NIRG AGR RP MA AA ∈=  
  Non-irrigated agricultural activities and goods 
{ } WAT NAG PE ∈= 
  Non-agricultural activity and good using primary water as input 
{ } ,, ,,,, , , NWAT NAG PEC IIE INIE EG BP BF DIE SMIE SMNIE ∈=  
Non-agricultural activities and goods no using primary water as input 
{ } ,, ,,, , , TRX TR RI MA PEC AA IIE INIE SMIE SMNIE ∈=  
  Importable and exportable activities and goods 
{ } ,, ,,, , , H Dakar ACU BA NIAY CASA ZSP SO FLEUV =  
Households (Dakar,  ACU  : Others urban areas, BA : groundnut basin,  NIAY  : Niayes, 
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Appendix 7: Results of the climatic shocks combined with the average cost water pricing (percent variation from the base path) 
   RI RP MA  PEC  AA IIE INIE  EG PE  BP  BF DIE  SMIE  SMNIE 
   1996  2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015  1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015
CM                                                  -35,6 17,88                             
Cm                                                  -35,6 17,88                             
CT                                                  -33,8 22,4                             
P  -8,23 12,4 0,55 -0,35 0,13  0,02  0,58 -0,39 0,65 -0,48 0,15 -0,05 0,35 -0,21 0,72 -0,06 -35,6 17,88 -10,82 7,36 -9,24 7,4 0,64 -0,47 0,59 -0,3 0,72 -0,31
PVA  -8,99 13,5 0,83 -0,58 0,97 -0,56  0,66 -0,46 0,67 -0,53 0,63 -0,41 0,68 -0,43 1,85 -0,35 -35,6 17,88  8,76 -0,2 15,65 -0,71 0,74 -0,54 0,88 -0,48 1,01 -0,45
PL  -8,24 12,4 0,55 -0,35 0,13  0,01  0,72  -0,5 0,67 -0,49 0,23 -0,08 0,46 -0,28 0,72 -0,06 -35,6 17,88 -10,82 7,36 -9,24 7,4 0,64 -0,47 0,64 -0,33 0,82 -0,37
PC  -4,13 5,46 0,55 -0,35 0,12  0,01  0,66 -0,47 0,59 -0,44 0,11 -0,04 0,28 -0,18 0,72 -0,06 -35,6 17,88 -10,82 7,36 -9,24 7,4 0,64 -0,47 0,62 -0,32 0,77 -0,34
R  -0,87 -0,26 1,29 -0,54 1,54  -0,54  0,64  -0,37 0,72 -0,43 0,62 -0,39 0,69 -0,36 2,11 -0,31 -33,8 0,26  10,69 -0,12 26,49 -0,81 1,31 -0,53 1,04 -0,44 1,12 -0,42
                                                                                      
M  -4,27  6,63       0,76  -0,87  1,29  -1,48 1,08 -1,41 0,45 -0,73 0,87 -1,08                               1,21 -1,25 1,48 -1,39
D  8,9 -13,9 0,46 -0,72 0,57  -0,99  0,2  -0,46 0,08 -0,35 0,11 -0,6 0,17 -0,47 0,25 -0,77 2,9 -3,61  1,78 -2,48 9,38 -10,1 0,56 -0,79 0,24 -0,55 0,25 -0,65
EX  23,9  -27,8       0,37  -1,11  -0,87  0,85 -0,91 0,86 -0,23 -0,43 -0,52 0,25                               -0,72 0,28 -0,96 0,27
XS  8,92  -13,9 0,46 -0,72 0,56 -0,99 -0,02 -0,17 0,05 -0,3 -0,01 -0,54 0,01 -0,29 0,25 -0,77 2,9 -3,61  1,78 -2,48 9,38 -10,1 0,56 -0,79 0,16 -0,48 0,1 -0,52
Q  1,97 -3,96 0,46 -0,72 0,58  -0,98  0,29  -0,55 0,19 -0,47 0,29 -0,66 0,46 -0,73 0,25 -0,77 2,9 -3,61  1,78 -2,48 9,38 -10,1 0,56 -0,79 0,28 -0,58 0,32 -0,49
KD     0,44    -0,78    -1,02    -0,32    -0,44    -0,58    -0,39    -0,85    23,38    -2,62    -10,1    -0,81    -0,56   -0,57
LD  -1,53 0,83 0,62 -0,95 0,86 -1,01 -0,03 -0,05 0,05 -0,26 -0,05 -0,3 0,02 -0,08 1,43 -0,45 -34,2 24,35  9,95 -1,86 25,65 -10 0,63 -0,79 0,37 -0,38 0,44 -0,37
TD  -1,29  0,61 0,86 -0,47 1,1  -0,64       0,3 -0,12                                                     
KL                                                  -8,72 23,63                             
INV        0,48 -0,55             0,43 -0,41 0,92 -1,03 0,75 -0,83 0,31 -1,02             11,31 -11,9       0,41 -0,6 0,25 -0,56
IND  -1,98 0,26 1,24 -1,48 1,61  -1,7  0,27  -0,7 0,39 -0,97 0,23 -1,04 0,34 -0,8 2,48 -1,04 -45,3 24,17 15,79 -2,25 42,22 -10,7 1,27 -1,47 0,86 -1,11 0,98 -1,08
DIT  2,1 -3,51 0,46 -0,72 0,14  -0,48  0,01  -0,31 0,04 -0,35 0,03 -0,4 0,1 -0,45 0,09 -0,49 2,9 -3,61  0,08 -0,49 0,56 -0,98 0,55 -0,97 0,1 -0,47 0,13 -0,54
   1996     2015 
w  0,67  -0,55 
rt  0,43  -0,89 
re1  -49,04  95,28 
re2  -23,75  57,98 
Pkl  -27,42  0,08 
SG  -1,89  0,08 
IT  1,03  -1,06 
EV  0,81  -0,77 
un  -0,9  0,85   34
Appendix 8:  Results of the climatic shocks combined with the marginal cost water pricing (percent variation from the base path) 
   RI  RP  MA PEC  AA IIE INIE  EG  PE  BP BF  DIE  SMIE  SMNIE 
   1996  2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015  1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015 1996 2015
CM                                                  -32,36 19,59                             
Cm                                                  -32,36 19,59                             
CT                                                  -29,65 30,79                             
P  -7,88  13,2 0,92 0,16 0,4 0,02 0,93 0,18 1,08 0,22 0,23 0,07 0,61 0,12 1,14 0,08 -47,97 -7,82 -14 -2,96 -12 -2,91 1,08 0,23 1,03 0,16 1,2 0,14
PVA  -8,64  14,4 1,39 0,24 1,53 0,25 1,05 0,21 1,12 0,24 0,74 0,24 1,05 0,21 2,73 0,22 -47,97 -7,82 12,4 0,66 22,19 1,16 1,22 0,27 1,44 0,2 1,65 0,16
PL  -7,9  13,2 0,92 0,16 0,41 0,01 1,16 0,23 1,11 0,24 0,36 0,11 0,8 0,16 1,14 0,08 -47,97 -7,82 -14 -2,96 -12 -2,91 1,08 0,23 1,12 0,17 1,37 0,16
PC  -3,95  5,8 0,92 0,16 0,38 0,01 1,07 0,21 0,99 0,21 0,17 0,06 0,48 0,09 1,14 0,08 -47,97 -7,82 -14 -2,96 -12 -2,91 1,08 0,23 1,08 0,16 1,3 0,16
R  -0,51  0,23 2,1 0,08 2,3 0,17 0,95 0,11 1,16 0,14 0,65 0,23 1,01 0,18 3,08 0,21 -29,65 1,25 15,2 0,74 38,07 1,7 1,97 0,11 1,7 0,14 1,8 0,12
                                                                                      
M  -3,76  8,21       1,38  0,14  2,01  0,44 1,76 0,47 0,64 0,07 1,46 0,47                               2,08 0,59 2,47 0,58
D  8,88 -13,8 0,7 0,03 0,76  0,11  0,26  -0,06 0,08 -0,04 0,1 -0,2 0,25 0,12 0,34 0 4,01 1,36  2,45 0,8 13 4,63 0,74 -0,06 0,39 0,23 0,4 0,23
EX  23,2  -28,6       0,15  0,08  -1,47  -0,69 -1,57 -0,61 -0,44 -0,53 -0,95 -0,3                               -1,27 -0,2 -1,62 -0,18
XS  8,9  -13,9 0,7 0,03 0,75  0,11 -0,09 -0,19 0,03 -0,06 -0,09 -0,33 -0,04 0,01 0,34 0 4,01 1,36 2,45 0,8 13 4,63 0,74 -0,06 0,25 0,19 0,15 0,18
Q  2,24 -3,17 0,7 0,03 0,8  0,11  0,4  -0,02 0,27 0,02 0,38 -0,05 0,74 0,27 0,34 0 4,01 1,36  2,45 0,8 13 4,63 0,74 -0,06 0,45 0,23 0,51 0,23
KD     0,78    0,27    0,23    -0,05    0,11    -0,3    0,08    0,02    30,33    0,67    3,77    0,16    0,3   0,24
LD  -1,62 0,68 0,96 -0,2 1,16  0,06 -0,17 -0,31 0,03 -0,13 -0,47 -0,4 -0,12 -0,1 1,94 -0,08 -30,43 31,55 13,9 1,36 36,53 5,88 0,83 -0,09 0,56 0,06 0,67 -0,03
TD  -1,38  0,4 1,21 -0,1 1,4  -0,02       0,27 -0,15                                                     
KL                                                  -7,61 30,63                             
INV  0  0 0,91 0,56 0 0 0 0 0,84 0,48 1,66 0,72 1,36 0,66 0,69 0,71 0 0  0 0 15,71 5,6 0 0 0,75 0,57 0,54 0,58
IND  -1,97 1,01 1,91 0,18 2,22  0,35  0,2 -0,03 0,5 0,16 -0,25 0 0,28 0,24 3,4 0,26 -40,76 32,99 22,4 2,06 62,26 7,26 1,72 0,17 1,31 0,36 1,47 0,25
DIT  2,14 -2,96 0,7 0,03 0,18  0,11  -0,03  0,02 0,02 -0,01 -0,03 -0,16 0,12 0,08 0,08 -0,06 4,01 1,36  0,08 -0,05 0,75 0,1 0,73 0,1 0,11 0,02 0,13 -0,11
   1996     2015 
w  1,13  0,29 
rt  0,88  0,5 
re1  -45,88  107,27 
re2  -23,47  59,48 
Pkl  -23,86  1,04 
SG  -5,82  -9,74 
IT  1,84  0,79 
EV  1,11  -0,18 
un  -1,5  -0,43   35
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Appendix 10: Results of the climatic shocks combined with the average cost water 









































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 11: Results of the climatic shocks combined with the marginal cost water 
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